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Evidence or Assertions? The Outcomes of Family
Preservation Services
Julia H. Littell
Bryn Mawr College

In theirreviewof researchon the effectsof familypreservationservicesin
childwelfare,HowardBathandDavidHaapala(SocialService
Review68 [September 1994]:386-404) raisequestionsaboutthe validityof three recent
controlledstudiesin this area.1The resultsof at leasttwo of these studies
services(FPS)are
challengethe widelyheld notionthat familypreservation
effectivein preventingtheout-of-homeplacementof children.Carefulexamiof findings,and
nationof the studies'methods,thoughtfulinterpretations
effortsto integratethisinformationintoexistingknowledgeaboutthe effects
of FPSare clearlywarranted.
Whenfacedwithempiricalevidencethatcontradicts
theory,one candismiss
the newevidence,attemptto modifythe theory,or ignorethe discrepancy.
The
articleby Bath and Haapalapresentsone approachto the reconciliation
of
betweentheoryand researchon the effectsof FPS.2
apparentcontradictions
Afteran attemptto dismissthe nullfindingsof severalrandomized
experiments
on methodological
grounds,theauthorscitestudiesthatemployedmuchweaker
thatFPSpreventout-of-home
designsassupportfortheirhypothesis
placements.
The authors'criticismsof the randomized
experimentsareincompleteand
often inaccurate.They use assertionsratherthan evidenceto dismissthe
findingsof these studies.Theirfailureto takeinto accountissuesof validity
in studiesthatappearto supporttheirownbeliefsconstitutesa seriouslapse,
one that resultsin misrepresentation
of the weightof the evidencein this
field.Theirreviewalsomissesimportantlessonsthatcanbe drawnfromthe
researchin this area.
StatisticalPower
The claimthat"designweaknessesleadingto lowstatistical
powerare largely
responsiblefor the negative conclusionsdrawnfrom the state-initiatedexperi-
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mental FPS evaluations" (p. 389) deserves close examination. Bath and
Haapala assert that the statisticalpower in these studies was low as a result
of the heterogeneity of respondents,treatment inconsistency,and instability
of outcome measures.The authorsnever mention the size of effects the studies
should have been able to detect, the level of power desired, or the sample
sizes required to meet these goals-nor do they present convincing evidence
that the experiments fell short of these goals.
Although it has been claimed that FPS result in dramaticreductionsin the
proportion of cases that require placement,"evaluationsshould be designed
to detect more modest effects. For the purposes of this discussion, I assume
that a reduction in the risk of placement of 20 percent has some practical
significance.Although we may want to detect smaller differences (say, 10%),
these are unlikely to be meaningful for policy purposes. Assuming the use of
a one-tailed test and an alpha level of .05, the power to detect between-group
differences of 20 percent (centered on 50%) was approximately.88 in New
Jersey, .97 in California,and over .99 in Illinois.4This means that there was
an 88-99 percent chance that the experimentswould have detected program
effects of 20 percent or more if theprogramshad sucheffects.Levels of power
of this magnitude are more than adequatefor researchon treatmenteffects.5
The Illinois study had the statisticalpower to detect even smaller effects
within 1 year after random assignment.6In fact, a very small but statistically
significant difference between groups was found in Illinois: FPS appeared to
result in an overall increasein the risk of placementfor children-an increase
of approximately 5 percent at 1 year after referral.' This effect could be
attributed to the "case finding" phenomenon Bath and Haapala describe,
although the gap between the experimentaland control groups in placement
rates disappeared once variations in case characteristicswere taken into
account.8
of Respondents
Heterogeneity
This brings us to the issue of heterogeneityof respondentsand the problems
this poses for the design and interpretationof FPS evaluations.It is true that
family preservationprogramsserve a very diverse clientele, and, as Bath and
Haapala argue, such heterogeneitycan reduce statisticalpower.
We are concerned here with client heterogeneity as it affects the main
dependent variable,that is, the likelihood of placement. In this respect, Bath
and Haapala cite studies in which there were differences among subgroups
in the rates of placement after FPS treatment. The authors refer to this as
evidence of the "differentialeffectiveness"of FPS (p. 390). Because there are
also differences among subgroupsin the likelihoodof placementin theabsence
of FPS, a comparison of subgroup placement rates after FPS is not sufficient
to determine whether the program has differential effects. Programeffects
(and differential effects) can be gauged only by comparing "base rates" of
placementin the absenceof FPSwith ratesafterFPSintervention.Information
on subgroup "base rates" can be obtained from control groups in randomized experiments.
As Bath and Haapala noted, most studies have not had the sample sizes
needed to examine programeffects for specificsubgroups of clients. But the
authors failed to present the evidence that does exist in this area. The Illinois
experiment includedexaminationof programeffects for 16 subgroups.9Contrary to Bath and Haapala'sclaims,'0 all but three of these subgroups had
sample sizes sufficient to detect program effects of 20 percent at a level of
power of .8." Results showed that FPS increasedthe risk of placement for
households headed by single adults but had no effect for any of the other
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subgroups.12The programalso had no effect on the risk of subsequent maltreatment for any of the subgroups.13Hence, at least in the Illinois study,
there is no reason to believe that heterogeneity is an explanation for negative findings.
Treatment
Inconsistency
Bath and Haapala suggest that "uncertaintyabout what the interventions...
actually consisted of ... suggests poor construct validity"(p. 392). On the
contrary,reports on each of the three experiments include extensive analysis
and discussion of the nature of services providedto clients.14
Lack of consistencyin the treatment of clients both within and across sites
is a reality-in FPS and in virtuallyany social program.Because the nature
of family problemsvaries from one case to the next and because the community and social settings in which FPSoperate are quite diverse,these programs
are never "single undifferentiatedentities."15Attention to variations in the
treatment provided to families within these studies indicatesthat the experiments were not based on the assumptionthat the treatmentwas undifferentiated. Although the authors point to the New Jersey experiment as "the study
that had the most consistentintervention"(p. 398), LeonardFeldman'sanalysis showed significant between-site differences in the duration and intensity
of services provided to clients in that state.16
The approach taken in Illinois was that it made sense to accept variation
within the FPS program because there is no evidence of the superiority of
any one model over another. The Illinois study can be viewed as a natural
experiment in whichvariationsamong programscan be examined.This experiment included 18 programsin six sites.17Three of the six experimentalsites
(two in Chicago and one in Peoria) had sample sizes sufficientto detect program effects of 20 percent (centered on 50%) at a level of power of .8. Sitespecificanalysesshowed that childrenin the FPSgroupsin both of the Chicago
sites were significantlymorelikely to be placed than children in the control
groups in those sites.18Differences in placement rates between the program
and control groups in the Peoria site (which had a single FPS provider)were
not significant.19
There is no foundation for the statement that "had positive effects been
demonstratedin these studies, it would have been impossibleto specify what
exactly was responsible for obtaining the results"(p. 392). The Illinois study
was certainlylarge enough to support analysesof this kind-and, in fact, my
colleagues and I have reported results of analyses of relationshipsbetween
FPS service characteristicsand outcomes.20
Placementas an OutcomeMeasure
As Bath and Haapala suggest, there are a number of problemswith the use
of placementas an outcome.21However,contraryto their suggestion,these are
not related to the stability(reliability)or validityof placementas an outcome
measure.22The authors have confused issues in the reliabilityand validityof
measures with questions about the appropriatenessand interpretationof an
outcome variable.
The reliabilityof placement as an outcome measure appears to be quite
straightforward:we want to know whether placement has occurred for each
case at various points in time after referralto FPS. Data on placementevents
can be derived from state foster care records. In many states, these records
are computerized and updated continuously;they are used to trackchildren
in the foster care systemand for paymentpurposes.When linked to payments
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for foster care, the reliabilityof data on placements is supported by the fact
that there are negative fiscal consequences (to either payor or payee) if data
are entered incorrectly.23In Illinois these records appear to be fairly reliable
(although, to my knowledge, there have been no empirical studies of the
reliabilityof administrativedata on placements).In some studies, information
on placements has also been obtained directlyfrom caseworkersand parents,
who are presumably knowledgeable about the placement status of certain
children. Variations in definitions of placement across studies and changes
over time in placement policies and rates withinjurisdictions raise issues of
external validity(i.e., whether the findingsapply to other settings and periods
of time), not reliability.There is no support for the statementthat "placement
status is an unstable measure with an inherently large error variance,which,
in turn, contributesto small effect sizes"(p. 393).
With respect to constructvalidity,Bath and Haapalasuggest that placement
is "onlyan indirectand distal measure of the family functioning changes that

FPS interventions claim to be able to make in order to avert placements"

(p. 392, emphasisadded).Becauseplacementpreventionhas been the primary
objective of FPS, placement is a direct measure of whether a program does
what it was intended to do, not a proxy for something else. As long as there
are claims that FPS "are able to prevent out-of-home placements"(p. 399),
such claims must be tested through the use of placement as an outcome
variable.However, this is not the only relevant outcome. The effects of FPS
on various aspects of child and family functioning are important-and these
effects have been examined in several studies.24
The view that many child welfare placements are "unnecessary"and that
placementsare "failures"of FPS is a social constructionof reality.The use of
placement as an outcome measure in evaluationresearchdoes not mean that
placement is necessarily a bad thing. Counting placements is not the same
thing as counting "failures."Any positive or negative connotation is in the
eyes of the beholder, and, as Bath and Haapala suggest, the meaning of outof-home placement depends to a great extent on the circumstancesof the
individualcase. The recognition that placementsare necessaryand "good"in
some cases raises questions about the wisdom of placement preventionas an
overriding objectiveof FPS.

Internal Validity
Bath and Haapala suggest that the findings of little or no difference between
programand control groups may have occurredas a result of diffusion, imitation, or compensatory equalization of treatments.25If cases in the control
groups receivedservicesthat were similarto FPS,comparableoutcomes would
be expected. Comparisonsof the amounts and types of services provided to
programand controlgroups are requiredto determinewhethersome equalization of treatments occurred.
Detailed comparisons of services provided to program and control cases
were conducted in the Illinois experiment.26In that study, one-fifth of the
cases in the control group were never opened for services in the state child
welfareagency, and 51 percent of those that were opened receivedno services
of any kind during the first 90 days after random assignment.27Overall, the
control group received far less intensive services than the FPS group (e.g.,
control cases received a median of 2.5 hours of face-to-face contact with
workersin the first 90 days of service, compared with 70.3 for FPS cases).28
Cases in the FPS groups were much more likely to receive counseling (93%
vs. 37% of controls) and concrete services (89% vs. 31%).29The FPS cases
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received a wider arrayof concrete services(median of four different types of
concrete servicesvs. a median of zero for the control group) and were more
30
likely to receive case assistancethan controls (74%vs. 7%). Interviewswith
a subsample of clients in the experiment support the conclusion that FPS
cases received much more extensive help than cases in the control group."'
Interviews with public child welfare workers helped to confirm and explain
these differences: workers who served cases in the control group usually
wanted to provide better services for their clients but were simply unable to
do so given much higher caseloads (an average of 50, comparedwith five for
FPS workers).32So we can conclude that, in Illinois at least, internal validity
was not threatened by diffusion or imitation treatments or by compensatory equalization.
There are other issues of internal validitythat Bath and Haapala did not
address. In the New Jersey experiment, 22 percent (33) of the 150 cases
assigned to the FPS group were not provided with FPS because they did not
meet the eligibilitycriteria,the caregiverrefused to participatein the program,
or a child was consideredat riskof harm and removedfrom the home.33These
cases were not trackedand were excludedfrom the analysis.In contrast,all of
the cases assigned to the control group were retainedin that group. The loss
of a substantialproportionof FPScasesclearlycould have affected the comparabilityof the experimental and control groups in New Jersey.34The finding
of higher placement rates in the control group than the FPS group in New
Jersey may be due largely to the fact that some "difficult"cases-including
cases in which placement was truly imminent-were excluded from the FPS
group but not from the control group.
Summary
In the Californiaand Illinois studies, findingsthat FPSdid not prevent placements cannot be explained by insufficientstatisticalpower or threats to internal validity.Although client heterogeneityand treatmentinconsistencyprobably had some effect on statisticalpower, the overall level of power in these
studies was so high to begin with that it is unlikely that the results can be
explained by these factors. Further, analyses that took into account client
heterogeneity and between-site differences in treatments in Illinois confirm
the findings that FPS did not prevent placements.Claimsthat outcome measures were unstable and that there may have been some equalizationof treatments among experimental and control cases are not credible.
In New Jersey, it is possiblethat the exclusion of certainkindsof cases from
the FPS group (but not from the control group) was responsiblefor observed
differences between groups.
The authorsdid not explain the fact that a numberof statisticallysignificant
differencesin the largest experimentwere in the "wrong"direction.(That is,
the IllinoisFPSprogramappearedto increasethe riskof placementfor children
in the Chicagoarea and for those in single-parentfamilies.)Although Bath and
Haapalaacknowledgethe possibilitythat FPS may have a "casefinding"effect,
it must be understoodthat this effect is exactlythe oppositeof what one would
expect to find if the placementpreventionhypothesiswere true.
Failure to reject the null hypothesis can be due to several conditions: the
null hypothesismaybe true (i.e., the programmay have no effect), the underlying theory may be faulty, the reliabilityor validityof measures may be weak,
or power may be insufficientto detectreal differencesbetween groups."5Bath
and Haapala'sarticle deals only with issues of validity and statisticalpower.
Issues of truth and theory remain.
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The Weight of the Evidence
Earlyevaluationsof familypreservationserviceswere not "unequivocallypositive," nor did they all report "high placement prevention success"(p. 387).
The results of early controlled studies were mixed: four randomizedexperiments and one comparison group study found that the programs did not
produce significantoverall reductions in placement.36Three randomizedexperimentsfound statisticallysignificant-but small-reductions in placement
in favor of the experimental groups.37
Of the studies reviewed by Bath and Haapala, only those with the weakest
controls for threats to internal validity show programeffects on placement.
The authors' emphasis on possible methodological limitations in the three
focal experiments stands in stark contrast to a complete lack of attention to
design problems inherent in the quasi experiments they reviewed.
The quasi experimentsemployed variousoverflowdesigns. Referringworkers can often manipulate these designs to ensure that certain families receive
intensive services.Some cases that are turned awayinitiallyfrom the program
may be referred again when there is an opening for services, whereas other
options (including placement)are pursued in the remainingoverflowcases.38
Without a careful record of the course of each case that enters an overflow
group, the comparability of the overflow group with FPS cases cannot be
assured. Thus, overflow studies may suffer from the threats to internal
validity that Thomas Cook and Donald Campbell termed "selection"and
"mortality."39
The overflowstudies cited by Bath and Haapalawere quite small.The study
reported by Sally Wood, Keith Barton, and Carroll Schroeder included 26
families in the FPS group and 24 who did not receive FPS.40The study by
Ira Schwartz,Philip AuClaire,and Linda Harrisinvolved an initial sample of
children who were approved for placement; 58 of these cases were diverted
to a FPS program,and a random sample of 58 of the cases that remained was
taken as a comparison group.41The evaluation of the Utah Homebuilders
program (reported by MarkFraser,Peter Pecora, and Haapala)had an overflow comparison group of 38 cases, out of which nearly one-third (12 cases)
were lost to follow-up.42This loss of a substantialproportion of comparison
cases is sufficient to invalidatethe study, because the comparabilityof treatment and comparison groups cannot be assured. Fraser and his colleagues
attempted to deal with this problem by matching a subsample of FPS and
comparison cases on several variables. However, the variables used in the
matching process were only weaklyrelated to placement, and the number of
matched pairs was quite small. Further, the researchers in the Utah study
relied on different sources of informationon placementsin the programand
comparison group.43
Bath and Haapalacite data from the state of Michiganon changes in placement rates over time as further evidence of the effects of FPS. When these
data were examined in terms of rates of foster care placement per thousand
children, there was no clear relationshipbetween FPS and placement rates.44
In any event, fluctuationsin placement rates over a few years do not provide
evidence for the effects of FPS because placement rates are affected by many
factors outside of these programs.45
There is also no convincing support for the cost-savingsarguments put
forth in Michigan.Familypreservationprogramsclearlyare more costly than
traditionalchild welfare services for intact families and less costly than outof-home placements. But, without convincing evidence that these programs
prevent placements, there is no reason to expect substantialreductions in
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costs. The Californiastudy is the only randomizedexperiment that provided
data on service costs. Although the costs of FPS were said to "comparefavorably" with the costs of out-of-home care, when the total costs of services
provided and placementsrequired by cases in the FPS and control group are
compared, it is clear that FPS resulted in increasedcosts in California.46
Bath and Haapala'sconclusion that "there is strong evidence that FPS are
able to significantlyreduce the placement rates of served, at-riskchildren"
(p. 389) appears to be based on three overflowcomparisonstudies, the New
Jersey experiment, and data on placement rates from the state of Michigan
that, as we have seen, all suffer from threatsto internalvalidity.47The recommendation that "untilconvincing evidence is forthcoming,it would be wisest
for program developers to base their initiativeson model program packages
that have some proven effectiveness"(p. 399) is confusing.Withoutconvincing
evidence, there is no proof of effectiveness.
In sum, the empirical evidence on the effects of FPS on the out-of-home
placement of children is mixed. The findings of recent controlled studies call
into question earlierclaimsabout the successof FPSin preventing placement.
The lack of effects on placementappearsto be due, at least in part,to difficulties in targeting FPS to families that are truly "at risk"of placement.
Targeting
Bath and Haapalasuggest that it is not "fair"to evaluatethe outcomes of FPS
when relativelyfew of the referred cases are at "imminentrisk"of placement
(as was the case in the three recent experiments). Yet, if FPS are to have a
substantialeffect on placements,they must first solve this targeting problem.
Given widespreadclaims of the success of FPS in preventing placementsand
the rapid proliferationof state-supportedFPSinitiatives,it is certainlyreasonable to assess both the targeting accuracyand placement prevention effects
of FPS projects.
Bath and Haapalaimply that difficultiesin the targetingof FPSare relatively
new,48but there is evidence to the contrary.Seven randomizedexperiments
conducted in the 1970s and 1980s on programsthat provided intensive inhome services designed to prevent placement showed that relativelyfew of
the cases referred were at risk of placement.49
The authors underestimatethe complexityof issues in the targetingof FPS.
This is more than a matter of workers'reluctance to refer the "right"cases.
The need for placement is sometimes difficult to predict because family circumstances can change rapidly and in ways that cannot always be foreseen
by caseworkers.Although referringworkersmay not be certainaboutwhether
or when placement will be necessary,they sometimes state that placement is
imminent in order to obtain thorough case assessmentsor servicesfor families
through FPS.so Many child protective services (CPS) workers believe that
"unnecessaryplacements"are very rare; thus, in their view, there are few
placements to be prevented. They often have other objectivesfor cases that
they pursue through FPS.51Workers knowingly refer cases that are not at
risk of placement because there are few alternativesfor these families."'The
fact that FPS provide immediate, intensive, and concrete help for families in
a service system in which such resources are scarce has led to an accretion
and shifting of goals for FPS.53To CPS workers,FPS may seem most useful
in addressingpreviouslyunmet serviceneeds of intactfamilies,54which constitute the largestproportionof cases in the child welfaresystem.Thus, although
most CPS workers place a high value on the services provided by FPS programs, they do not tend to view them as an alternativeto placement.55
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Contextual Issues
Bath and Haapala providea useful discussionof contextualfactorsthat affect
FPS and their evaluations. As they suggest, there are substantialvariations
serviceoptions,decisionacrosssettingsin client and communitycharacteristics,
making practices,and the policies and politics of child welfare. These variations can limit the generalizabilityof FPS evaluations.
Contraryto the authors'assertions,contextual factorshave little to do with
the internal validity of evaluations or the strength of conclusions one can
draw about the effects of specific FPS programs.56Rather,informationabout
the service context can help us understandtargeting problems,limitationsof
FPS, and why some approaches may be more successful in certain locations
or with specific types of clients than others.
Recognitionof the unique contexts in which FPS operate also points to the
need to tailor these servicesto fit local needs, even though this tailoringmay
contribute to "treatmentinconsistency"and "modeldrift."Although it might
be desirableto find programmodelsthat are so robust that they can withstand
the various adaptations needed to be effective in different sites, it does not
appear that this has been achieved in FPS.57
All of this suggests that the question, Does FPSwork?--which is the central
concern of Bath and Haapala'sreview-does not adequatelyreflectreal-world
constraintsand variationsin the ways in which FPS operate.
Toward More Realistic Expectations
Is it reasonable to expect FPS (or any short-termintervention)to have dramatic, lasting effects on family functioning, leading to substantialreductions
in rates of out-of-home placementand the costs of child welfareservices?The
findings of recent experiments suggest that the answer to this question is no.
This answer makes sense in light of the serious problems faced by families
in the child welfare system, the lack of supportsfor these families outside of
FPS, and the impact of larger social, economic, and environmentalinfluences
on families.We have suggested that the child welfaresystemalone cannot be
expectedto solveproblemsof substanceabuse,poverty,mentalillness,and family
violence that can lead to child maltreatmentand out-of-homeplacement."8
What should we expect? The FPS experiments in New Jersey and Illinois
found a few significantdifferences in favor of the FPS groups in measuresof
child and family functioning."9In Illinois,it was shown that these effects were
short-term and that they dissipated over time.60Thus, it may be reasonable
to hope for some positive changes in families as a result of FPS, although
these benefits are likely to be modestand (in the absence of adequate followup services) short-term.
Through intensive, in-home services we can learn a great deal about the
nature of problems faced by the families in child welfare. In some cases, this
will lead to the discoveryof conditionsthat pose serious risksto children, new
reports of child maltreatment,and out-of-home placements.The value of FPS
is that they provide immediate, intensive, and flexible serviceswhere they are
needed. But it is not realistic to expect these programs,remarkableas they
are, to produce any quick fix.
Conclusions
What does the research on FPS reallytell us? First, it tells us that there are
widespreadproblemsin the targetingof FPS.61These programsare not serving
the group of families for whom they were intended. It appears that FPS are
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being used to serve aims other than placement prevention. Second, we have
learned that the expectation that FPS will result in dramaticreductions in
placements and in the costs of child welfare services is unrealistic.
The debateover the effects of FPS still centers on very few rigorous studies.
More solid evidence is needed, particularlyon the effects of the Homebuilders
model.62There is also need for more refined analyses of effects of various
types of FPS for different kinds of families. The question, Does FPS work?
promotes an overly simplistic view of families, program processes, and the
intricate "servicecontext"in which they interact.
Through the developmentof the Homebuildersprogram,Haapalaand his
colleagues have made extraordinarycontributionsto the field of child welfare.
Homebuildersand other family preservationprogramshave resulted in tangible improvementsin the quality and quantityof servicesavailableto families
in child welfare. These programsoffer many examples of "best practice"in
the field. Now, faced with mounting evidence that initial expectations for
these programs have not been met, it is time to move beyond the rhetorical
argumentsthat seem to engulf familypreservationservicestowardnew understandings of what these programscan and cannot accomplish.

Notes
1. The threefocalexperimentsare describedin LeonardH. Feldman,"Assessing
the Effectiveness
of FamilyPreservation
Servicesin NewJerseywithinan Ecological
Context"(NewJerseyDivisionof Youthand FamilyServices,Bureauof Research,
Evaluation,and QualityAssurance,Trenton,N.J., 1991);WalterR. McDonaldand
of AB 1562In-HomeCareDemonstration
associates,"Evaluation
Projects:FinalReCalif.,1990);andJohn R.
port"(WalterR. McDonaldand associates,Sacramento,
Schuerman,Tina L. Rzepnicki,andJulia H. Littell,PuttingFamiliesFirst:An Experiment

in FamilyPreservation
N.Y.:Aldinede Gruyter,1994).
(Hawthorne,

2. Here, "theory"is used in its informalsense, meaningan explanationor conjecture.
There is no single theory behind FPS;rather,these programsrely on variouscombinations of crisis intervention theory, family systems theory, social learning theory, and
ecologicaltheory (RichardP. Barth, "TheoriesGuiding Home-BasedIntensive Family
in
PreservationServices,"in ReachingHigh RiskFamilies:IntensiveFamilyPreservation
HumanServices,ed. James K. Whittaker,Jill Kinney,ElizabethM. Tracy,and Charlotte
Booth [Hawthorne,N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter,1990]).
3. For example, Jill Kinney, David Haapala, and CharlotteBooth stated that "for
families with at least one child at imminent riskof placement,Homebuilders[']success
in avoiding placementat 12 months following the initiationof service has variedfrom
TheHomebuilders
73 to 91% of families served"(KeepingFamiliesTogether:
Model[Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991], p. 185). The assumptionhere is that the risk
of placement has been reduced from 100 percent to 27 percent or less.
4. Differencesof 20 percent centered on 50 percent would result in placementrates
of 60 percent in one group and 40 percent in the other. This difference is the same
as a "generic effect size" of .4 (MarkW. Lipsey, DesignSensitivity:
StatisticalPowerfor
Research[NewburyPark,Calif.:Sage, 1990]). Powerestimateswere derived
Experimental
from tables providedby Jacob Cohen, Statistical
PowerAnalysis
for theBehavioralSciences,
2d ed. (Hillsdale, N.J.: LawrenceErlbaum, 1987). Estimatesof the level of statistical
power are based on the number of cases in the treatmentand control groups. In the
New Jersey study, there were 97 families in the control group and 117 in the FPS
group-not including 33 cases assigned to FPS that were subsequentlyturned back
and lost to follow-up (Feldman, "Assessingthe Effectivenessof Family Preservation
Services"[n. I above]).The Californiastudyhad 152 familiesin both groups(McDonald
and associates[n. 1 above]). In the Illinois experiment, there were 995 families in the
FPS group and 569 controls;valid data on placementswere availableon 984 FPS cases
and 552 control cases (Schuerman,Rzepnicki,and Littell, PuttingFamiliesFirst [n. 1
above]).Becausethe treatmentand controlgroupsin the NewJerseyand Illinoisstudies
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were of unequalsize, harmonicmeanswere used to estimatepower(the harmonic
meansare 106for NewJerseyand707 forIllinois)(seeCohen[above]).The argument
that effectivesamplesizeswere actuallymuch smaller,becauseof bad targeting,is
specious.Targetingaccuracymerelyshiftsthe percentages.Forexample,in a welldifferencesmaybe centeredon valuesover50 pertargetedprogram,between-group
cent (e.g.,thiswouldbe the caseif placementrateswere90%in one groupand70%
in the other),whereasdifferencesof the samemagnitudewillbe centeredon lower
valuesin a poorlytargetedprogram(e.g.,placementratesof 30%and10%).Differences
centeredon valuesaboveor below50 percentyieldrelativelylargeeffectsizes-that
is, theyareeasier(requireless statistical
power)to detectthandifferencesthatcenter
on 50 percent.However,theremaybe a "flooreffect"whenplacementratesin the
controlgroupare so low thattherearefew placementsto be prevented.In thiscase,
anydifferencesbetweengroupsareboundto be slight.Thismayhaveoccurredin the
firstfew monthsafterrandomassignmentin the Illinoisstudy,althoughplacement
ratesin the controlgrouproseto over20 percentwithinthefirstyear(seeSchuerman,
Rzepnicki,and Littell,PuttingFamiliesFirst[n. I above]).
5. Cohen (n. 4 above) recommends.8 as a minimum standardfor statisticalpower.
6. In the Illinois experiment, the level of power to detect a 10 percent difference
between groups centered on 50 percent was approximately.98; the power to detect
differencesof 10 percent centered on 20 percentwas over .99 (see Cohen [n. 4 above]).
7. Schuerman,Rzepnicki,and Littell,PuttingFamiliesFirst(n. 1 above).
8. Ibid.
9. See John R. Schuerman, Tina L. Rzepnicki,Julia H. Littell, and Amy Chak,
"Evaluationof the Illinois FamilyFirst PlacementPreventionProgram:Final Report"
(Chapin Hall Center for Children at the Universityof Chicago, Chicago, 1993); and
Schuerman, Rzepnicki,and Littell, PuttingFamiliesFirst (n. 1 above). The subgroups
examined were families that were new to the child welfare system;families in which a
child had been physicallyinjured prior to referral;cases of chronic neglect; families
with housing problems;families with severe income or resource deficits;familieswith
cocaine problems; families with alcohol problems; cases with other substance abuse
problems;families in which a parent had a chronic mental illness or serious emotional
problem; cases with marital or adult relationshipproblems;cases with serious childcare skill deficits; families in which a child had a health, developmental,or learning
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while retaining adequate statisticalpower to detect treatmenteffects"(p. 390).
11. Samples of 64 cases or more in the control group and 96 or more in the FPS
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problemsother than cocaine or alcohol abuse, and familiesin which the primarycaregiver was a teenager (see Schuerman, Rzepnicki,and Littell, PuttingFamiliesFirst[n.
1 above]).
12. Schuerman,Rzepnicki,and Littell,PuttingFamiliesFirst(n. 1 above). For singleparent families, the risk of placement at 1 year after random assignment was .20 for
control cases, comparedwith .29 for those in the FPS group. Earlierfindingsthat FPS
reduced the riskof placementfor familieswith maritalproblemsand for cases in which
a child had been seriouslyinjuredprior to referral(Schuermanet al. [n. 9 above])were
not borne out in the final analysis.
13. Schuerman, Rzepnicki, and Littell, PuttingFamiliesFirst (n. 1 above). Earlier
evidence that FPS reduced the risk of maltreatmentfor families in which there had
been chronic child neglect (Schuerman et al. [n. 9 above]) was not upheld in the
final analysis.
14. See Leonard Feldman, "Evaluatingthe Impact of FamilyPreservationServices
in NewJersey"(NewJersey Divisionof Youth and FamilyServices,Bureauof Research,
Evaluation,and QualityAssurance,Trenton, N.J., 1990), and "Assessingthe Effective-

348

Social Service Review

ness of FamilyPreservationServices"(n. 1 above);McDonaldandassociates(n. 1 above);
Julia H. Littell and Jeanne Howard, with Stephen Budde, Cindy Chrisman,Brenda
Eckhardt,and Diane Pellowe, "The Nature of the Workwith Familiesin FamilyFirst"
(Chapin Hall Center for Children at the Universityof Chicago, Chicago, 1990);Julia
H. Littell, Jeanne Howard, Tina L. Rzepnicki, Stephen Budde, and Diane Pellowe,
"Interventionwith Familiesin the Illinois FamilyPreservationProgram"(Chapin Hall
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Tina L. Rzepnicki,Julia H. Littell,and associates,"Evaluationof the IllinoisFamilyFirst
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Programs:A Reportto
theEdna McConnellClarkFoundation[New York: Edna McConnellClark Foundation,
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that "the assumption behind this evaluation approach [is] that the intervention is a
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16. Feldman, "Assessingthe Effectiveness of Family PreservationServices"(n. I
above).
17. One geographicsite with two FPSprogramswasdropped from the Illinoisexperiment (Schuerman,Rzepnicki,and Littell,PuttingFamiliesFirst[n. 1 above]).
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. For a discussionof these issues, see John R. Schuerman,Tina L. Rzepnicki,and
Julia H. Littell, "FromChicagoto LittleEgypt: Lessonsfrom an Evaluationof a Large
Scale Child WelfareFamily PreservationProgram,"in FamilyPreservation
Services:Researchand Evaluation,ed. Kathleen Wells and David E. Biegel (NewburyPark, Calif.:
Sage, 1991).
22. Bath and Haapalastated that "the placementmeasure ... has dubiousconstruct
validityin that it is only a proxy for the more immediateor proximalchanges a family
is presumed to make during the intervention, and it fails to account positively for
desirable placement outcomes. Its reliabilityis also suspect, as it is dependent on so
many fluid macro or contextual factors,to say nothing of the numerous definitionsof
placement that have actuallybeen used" (p. 393).
23. MarkE. Courtneyand RaymondC. Collins,"NewChallengesand Opportunities
in Child WelfareOutcomesand InformationTechnologies,"Childrenand YouthServices
Review73 (September-October 1994): 359-78.
24. For example, see Feldman, "Assessingthe Effectivenessof FamilyPreservation
Services"(n. 1 above); and Schuerman, Rzepnicki, and Littell, PuttingFamiliesFirst
(n. 1 above).
25. For a descriptionof these threats to internal validity,see Thomas D. Cook and
Donald T. Campbell, Quasi-Experimentation:
Designand AnalysisIssuesfor Field Settings
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979).
26. See Schuerman, Rzepnicki,and Littell, PuttingFamiliesFirst(n. 1 above). Data
on the amounts and types of services provided to control cases were not obtained in
the California and New Jersey experiments (McDonaldand associates[n. 1 above];
Feldman, "Assessingthe Effectivenessof FamilyPreservationServices"[n. 1 above]).
27. Schuerman,Rzepnicki,and Littell,PuttingFamiliesFirst(n. 1 above).
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Feldman, "Assessingthe Effectiveness of Family PreservationServices"(n. I
above).
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Design,andAnalysis:An IntegratedApproach(Hillsdale,N.J.: LawrenceErlbaum,1991).
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36. See D. N. Willemsand R. DeRubeis,"The Effectivenessof Intensive Preventive
Servicesfor Familieswith Abused, Neglected, or DisturbedChildren:Hudson County
Project Final Report"(New Jersey Division of Youth and FamilyServices, Bureau of
Research,Trenton, N.J., 1981); StephenJ. Leeds, "Evaluationof Nebraska'sIntensive
ServicesProject"(National ResourceCenter on FamilyBased Services,Cedar Rapids,
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Project: Demonstrationand Research in Intensive Services to Families"(Hennepin
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Abused Children: Two Controlled Field Studies,"ChildAbuseand Neglect9 [1985]:
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on placement. Although the number of cases was extremely small, the program appeared to reduce the risk of placementamong less difficultcases but not among more
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during, and after programimplementation;this design does not control for threats to
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Families:
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Based vs. TraditionalChild ProtectionServices:A Study of the Home Based Services
DemonstrationProjectin the RamseyCountyCommunityHuman ServicesDepartment"
(RamseyCountyCommunityHuman ServicesDepartment,St. Paul, 1983).
38. This patternof repeatedreferralsof selectedcasesto FPSwasobservedin Illinois
prior to the implementationof a randomizedexperiment in that state.
39. Selection is "a threat when an effect may be due to the difference between the
kindsof people in one experimentalgroup as opposed to another.Selectionis therefore
pervasivein quasi-experimentalresearch,which is defined in terms of different groups
receiving different treatments"(Cook and Campbell[n. 25 above], p. 53). Differential
attritionor mortalityis a threatto internalvaliditywhen subjectsdrop out of a particular
treatmentgroup during the courseof an experiment."Thisresultsin a selectionartifact,
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40. SallyWood, Keith Barton,and CarrollSchroeder,"In-HomeTreatmentof Abusive Families:Cost and Placementat One Year,"Psychotherapy
25, no. 3 (1988): 409-14.
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"FamilyPreservationServicesas an Alternativeto the Out-of-HomePlacementof Adolescents: The Hennepin County Experience,"in Wellsand Biegel, eds. (n. 21 above).
42. MarkW. Fraser,Peter J. Pecora, and David A. Haapala,Familiesin Crisis:The
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1991).
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44. Ira M. Schwartz,"The SystemicImpact of FamilyPreservationServices:A Case
Study," in Home-Based Servicesfor Troubled Children, ed. Ira M. Schwartz and Philip

AuClaire(Lincoln:Universityof NebraskaPress, 1994).
45. The threats to internal validity that Cook and Campbell (n. 25 above) term
"history,""selection,"and "the interactionof historyand selection"are relevant here.
In this context, "history"refers to events outsidethe programthat may affect placement
rates.For example, Schwartz(n. 44 above)noted that a recentdrop in the substantiation
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tion in Michiganwas not random,and initialdifferencesbetweenselectedsitesand
othersitesare not fullyunderstood.
Programplannersoftenimplementpilotprojects
in settingsin whichtheyaremostlikelyto succeed.In Michigan,
it is possiblethatthe
commitment
of childprotective
services(CPS)workers
to theidealof familypreservation
was greaterin the initialFPSsitesthan in othersites.Regardingthe interactionof
of FPSmayhavesystemiceffectson local
historyand selection,the implementation
In selectedsites,workersmaybecomelesslikely
childwelfaredecision-making
practices.
to seekout-of-homeplacementsfor childrenas a resultof attentionpaidto the value
of preservingfamilies,apartfromany improvements
in familyfunctioningthat may
be broughtaboutby FPSservices.
46. See McDonaldandassociates(n. 1 above).Becausethe California
FPSprogram
did not preventplacements,the costsof placementsin the twogroupswereroughly
equivalent($141,375for 152FPScases,and$145,388for 152controlcases).However,
the FPSprogramitselfcostanaverageof $4,767perfamily,orapproximately
$725,000
for the 152familiesin the experimental
andLittell,
group(seeSchuerman,
Rzepnicki,
First[n. 1 above]).
PuttingFamilies
47. The authorsalsonote thatresultsof smallerstudiesof FPSare "encouraging"
(p. 399)but provideno referencesto supportthisclaim.
48. BathandHaapalasuggestthatthe "poolof preventable
hasbecome
placements"
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that showa decreaseover a 15-yearperiodin the percentageof childmaltreatment
thatresultedin placement.However,it shouldbe understood
thatthere
investigations
wasa dramaticincreasein the denominator
(thenumberof investigations)
duringthis
in fostercare admissions
time. Like most states,Californiaexperiencedan increase
between 1985 and 1990. See RichardP. Barth, MarkCourtney,Jill Duerr Berrick,and
ServicesPathways
Planning:ChildWe~fare
Vicky Albert, FromChildAbuseto Permanency
and Placements(Hawthorne,N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1994).
49. See Mitchell,Tovar, and Knitzer(n. 36 above); Szykulaand Fleischman(n. 36
above); Willems and DeRubeis (n. 36 above); Halper and Jones (n. 37 above); Leeds
(n. 37 above);Lyle and Nelson (n. 37 above);Jones, Neuman, and Shyne (n. 37 above);
and a follow-upreportby MaryAnn Jones (ASecondChance
for Families,Five YearsLater:
Follow-Upof a Programto PreventFosterCare [New York: Child Welfare League of
America, 1985]).
50. Evidenceof this practicecomes from the stateof Washingtonand from our interviews with CPS workersin Illinois.In Washington,where referringworkersmust state
thata childis at imminentriskof placementin orderto referfamiliesto the Homebuilders
program(see Kinney, Haapala,and Booth [n. 3 above]),a CPS workerwas quoted as
saying,'The truthis that I lie aboutimminentrisk.We all do if we thinkthe familiesneed
the service"(Duff Wilson,"BigNo-Bid Contractwith DSHS DrawsFirefor Cost,"Seattle
Times[March8, 1994], p. Al). Another CPS workersaid,"Youdo what you have to do
to get the service.We lied"(Wilson[above]).This practicewas also recountedin Illinois,
where CPS workersdescribedit as "advocacy"
on behalfof their clients.
51. See Julia H. Littell,John R. Schuerman,Tina L. Rzepnicki,Jeanne Howard,and
Stephen Budde, "ShiftingObjectivesin FamilyPreservationPrograms,"in Advancing
Practice,ed. E. Susan Mortonand R. Kevin Grigsby(NewburyPark,
FamilyPreservation
Calif.: Sage, 1993).
52. This ideawassuggestedby StephenBuddeon the basisof his dissertationresearch
in progress(personalcommunication,September 1994).
53. Ibid.; Littell et al. (n. 51 above).
54. Stephen Budde, "Placementand FamilyPreservationReferralDecisionsby Child
ProtectionInvestigators:A QualitativeStudy"(paperpresentedat the NationalAssociation for Family-BasedServicesSixth Annual EmpoweringFamiliesConference,Seattle,
December 11, 1992).
55. Ibid.
56. Bath and Haapalastated that "anyfailure to demonstratethe superiorityof an
FPS program over normal service controls may ... be due to contextual factors that
can affect both the internal and external validityof any evaluationdesign"(p. 397).
57. For example, a small quasi experiment showed that Homebuilders-which is
arguablythe premier FPS model-did not appear to be effective in preventingplacements in the Bronx (see Mitchell, Tovar, and Knitzer [n. 36 above]). This project
included an overflow comparison group of 11 families and a treatment group of 22
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familiesreferredfrom the same source.Although the studyclearlylackedthe statistical
power to detect program effects of practicalsignificance,it is important to note that
placementratesin the treatmentgroup werehigherthan those in the comparisongroup.
58. Schuerman,Rzepnicki,and Littell,PuttingFamiliesFirst(n. I above).
59. Feldman, "Assessingthe Effectiveness of Family PreservationServices"(n. 1
above); Schuerman,Rzepnicki,and Littell,PuttingFamiliesFirst(n. 1 above).
60. Schuerman,Rzepnicki,and Littell,PuttingFamiliesFirst(n. 1 above).
61. In the statesof Michiganand Washington,Homebuildersand others have undertaken special projectsaimed at solving the targeting problems.
62. Severalpromisingefforts to augmentthe researchin this area are now underway.
For example,BettyBlytheand her colleagueshave mounteda randomizedexperimentin
Detroitthatincludeseffortsto improvethe targetingof FPS.Furtherevidenceof the effect
of FPSwill also be developedin a nationalevaluationfundedby the U.S. Departmentof
Health and Human Servicesassistantsecretaryfor planningand evaluation.

Evaluation Outcomes of Family Preservation
Services and the Way Ahead: A Reply to Littell
Howard I. Bath
MarymeadChildand FamilyCentre,Canberra,Australia
David A. Haapala
Bold Solutions,Tacoma,Washington

In her response to our article "Family Preservation Services: What Does the
Outcome Research Really Tell Us?" (Social ServiceReview 68 [September 1994]:
386-404), Julia Littell questions some of our arguments with particular reference to the research undertaken by the Chapin Hall group.' The research
from this group has contributed a great deal to our understanding of family
preservation services (FPS) and the complex issues that surround their implementation; however, the experimental component of their research and the
conclusions that were reached were, we believe, fundamentally flawed. Conceptually, the experimental design was sound enough, but, as is often the case
in such research, the researchers had little control over powerful factors in
the service delivery context that led to serious problems with internal validity.
It was the premise of our article that the no-effect conclusions from two major
experimental, and widely cited, FPS evaluations "need to be interpreted with
great caution" (p. 399)-in our view, this remains the case.
Ironically, we find ourselves agreeing with both of the conclusions to Littell's
paper, in particular, her assertion that "the question, Does FPS work? promotes an overly simplistic view of families, program processes, and the intricate
'service context' in which they interact" (p. 346). It was precisely this concern
that prompted our paper in the light of the simplistic interpretations of the
Illinois and Californiaz evaluations that were gaining currency. We acknowledge that the authors of both studies were more cautious in interpreting
their results than external commentators and the media have been, but these

